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Closing the emissions gap between Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and the
global emissions levels needed to achieve the Paris Agreement’s climate goals will require a
comprehensive package of policy measures. National and sectoral policies can help fill the
gap, but success stories in one country cannot be automatically replicated in other countries.
They need to be adapted to the local context. Here, we develop a new Bridge scenario based
on nationally relevant, short-term measures informed by interactions with country experts.
These good practice policies are rolled out globally between now and 2030 and combined
with carbon pricing thereafter. We implement this scenario with an ensemble of global
integrated assessment models. We show that the Bridge scenario closes two-thirds of the
emissions gap between NDC and 2 °C scenarios by 2030 and enables a pathway in line with
the 2 °C goal when combined with the necessary long-term changes, i.e. more comprehen-
sive pricing measures after 2030. The Bridge scenario leads to a scale-up of renewable
energy (reaching 52%–88% of global electricity supply by 2050), electrification of end-uses,
efficiency improvements in energy demand sectors, and enhanced afforestation and refor-
estation. Our analysis suggests that early action via good-practice policies is less costly than
a delay in global climate cooperation.
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In the Paris Agreement, countries agreed to limit globalwarming to well below 2 °C, and preferably 1.5 °C1. Forimplementation, the Paris Agreement relies on mitigation
action at the national level. These actions are communicated via
nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and long-term
strategies, containing each country’s pledged contribution to
global mitigation. A key question is whether the collective action
of all countries leads to the implementation of the Paris Agree-
ment’s climate goals2,3. For this, countries agreed on a global
stocktake process to periodically review collective progress and, if
needed, stimulate additional efforts to meet the Paris Agreement’s
global climate mitigation goals.
Several publications have already shown that the aggregated
impact of NDCs is insufficient4,5. In addition, global emissions
implied by nationally implemented policies are, collectively, even
exceeding the global emissions levels projected under current
NDCs4. This means that current NDCs and policies need to be
strengthened. Scenarios from global integrated assessment models
(IAMs) can provide guidance on how to do this. These include
scenarios that provide information on how to implement
reductions cost-optimally. However, in reality, it is not always
possible to implement the measures included in these cost-
optimal pathways6. For instance, influential societal actors might
be able to block certain measures if they go against their interests.
Market distortions can also make certain measures unattractive.
Other solutions might lack societal support (e.g., carbon capture
and storage), and also the rate at which a transition can be
implemented may be slowed down (e.g., in the case of closing coal
mines given the impact on coal miners and coal-dependent
regions and communities). At the same time, however, there is
also evidence of effective implementation of climate policies7.
Here, good practice policies are defined as successfully imple-
mented policies in one or more countries with a noticeable
impact on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. In some cases, these
policies are not even part of the cost-optimal mix suggested by
models but could be easier to implement. It has been suggested
that scaling up these good practice policies to other parts of the
world might in the short-term be a more feasible and convincing
strategy8–13.
First of all, history has shown that costs are only one factor
influencing policy choices (see, e.g., Trutnevyte14, and the
example of investments in renewable energy in the period that
costs were still high). Other factors that influence policy choices
include societal support, the influence of specific actors, and
possible (perceived) co-benefits and trade-offs, including impacts
on competitiveness. Second, such good practice policies have
already been implemented in some countries, showing their
effectiveness, at least in some places. Third, earlier work15 sug-
gests that strengthening administrative and firm capabilities
involved with monitoring, reporting and verification of emissions
to support trading systems requires time and effort. Literature on
policy sequencing16,17 shows how policies go through stages and
at some point gain enough traction, experience, and political
momentum to eventually move to efficient carbon pricing.
Fekete et al.7, Roelfsema et al.8, and Kriegler et al.9 investigated
the impact of replicating such good practice policies in other parts
of the world by focusing on global GHG emissions and indicators
related to implementability (such as maximum annual average
emissions reduction rate, carbon price increase per decade, or
cumulative CCS deployment). Although helpful as a first step, this
earlier work is limited by 1) the formulation of good practice
policies at the global scale and 2) being based on a limited number
of models. Better information on such good practice policies is
needed to support the UNFCCC global stocktake in 2023.
Here, we build on the earlier work7–9, also going beyond
relatively abstract cost-optimal pathways as guidance for policy-
making by focusing on concrete policy measures that can be
implemented to close the emissions gap. We do this for the first
time using multiple models (both global and national) to assess a
common set of reduction measures. These measures have been
defined in consultation with national experts, making the sce-
narios more relevant (see Methods for details). The key scenario
is referred to as the Bridge scenario, as it aims to bridge the gap
between the ambition levels set out by countries by 2030 and
those consistent with limiting global warming to 2 °C. This sce-
nario includes a set of well-defined measures that can be imple-
mented in the 2020–2030 period and go beyond the ambition of
the NDCs (good practice policies), and that would still allow
reaching the Paris climate goals by transitioning to a cost-optimal
path towards 2 °C after 2030 (see Methods), assuming that gov-
ernments prepare the ground for comprehensive (pricing) mea-
sures that are socially acceptable, e.g. through the use of
revenues18. A focus on successfully implemented policies, as done
in the Bridge scenario, will likely have near-term advantages in
terms of political feasibility compared to an approach that focuses
solely on cost-effectiveness (see above). The Bridge scenario, for
example, allows to follow the steps identified in work on policy
sequencing and thus move more smoothly than scenarios
focusing on cost-effectiveness. The sequencing of policies can be
attractive for other reasons as well. This allows, for instance, a
gradual phase-in of climate policy per sector, e.g., to give
households time to adjust. This concern applies particularly to
investments related to residential energy use, where the lifetime of
infrastructure typically extends beyond a few years. Additionally,
the policy package that we apply is regionally differentiated, with
higher-income countries taking more significant action in the
2020s. This can address some of the feasibility concerns observed
in cost-optimal scenarios, allocating mitigation efforts to low-
income countries in the near term (given the high potential for
low-cost options, but with considerable feasibility concerns). We
show that the Bridge scenario closes two-thirds of the emissions
gap between NDC and 2 °C scenarios by 2030 and enables a
pathway in line with the 2 °C goal when combined with more
comprehensive pricing measures after 2030. Our analysis suggests
that early action via these good-practice policies is less costly than
a delay in global climate cooperation.
Results
In order to discuss the possible impacts of the Bridge scenario, we
compare it to four other scenarios, i.e., the impacts of current
policies (CurPol), the conditional NDCs (NDCplus), and the
models’ cost-optimal pathways towards 2 °C (starting immedi-
ately: 2Deg2020, and with a delay: 2Deg2030) (see Methods and
Supplementary Information for more details). For the first two
scenarios, the current policies and NDCs were extended beyond
2030 by assuming equivalent effort, i.e., by extrapolating the
equivalent carbon price in 2030, using the GDP growth rate of the
different regions up to 2050 for the extrapolation (see Supple-
mentary Methods). For the Bridge scenario, the defined set of
measures was implemented up to 2030 (Table 1) and a cost-
optimal path towards 2 °C was implemented after 2030
(see Supplementary Methods). A full description of the scenarios
and additional results can be found in the Supplementary
Information. In the context of the global stocktake, here we focus
on the results at the global level and several large countries, while
more detailed national-level results by national models can be
found elsewhere11.
A bridge over the emissions gap. The model outcomes (Fig. 1
and Supplementary Figs. 8 and 9) show that the CurPol and
NDCplus scenarios both fall considerably short of the emission
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reductions needed to limit global warming to 2 °C (consistent
with earlier work). In contrast, the good practice policies included
in the Bridge scenario can reduce GHG emissions close to the
needed levels in 2030, followed by a longer-term trajectory similar
to the ambitious benchmark of 2Deg2020. The Bridge scenario
has a less steep reduction than the 2Deg2030 scenario in the
2030s, offering a pathway that largely closes the 2030 emissions
gap without adding substantial challenges in the 2030s and 2050s.
The emissions gap is defined as the difference between the
NDCplus scenario and the 2Deg2020 scenario (median: 11.8
GtCO2eq). The Bridge scenario closes that global emissions gap
by 7.2 GtCO2eq or 60% (median, range 26–275%) by 2030 and
compensates the slower start by a slightly deeper emission
reduction in 2050, 106% (92–112%). Some recently submitted
NDCs could not be considered as they came after the cut-off date
of this work. Based on the Synthesis report by the UNFCCC19,
global emissions levels under the NDCs would be 398 Mt CO2eq
lower in 2030 when taking these into account (i.e., 3.4% of the
Table 1 The good practice policies that were assumed to be replicated globally in the Bridge scenario, with differentiated targets











Treat manure from livestock with anaerobic
digesters—Reduction of CH4 emissions from
manure, relative to 2015
33% by 2030 15% by 2030
Increase nitrogen use efficiency—Reduction
of N2O emissions from fertilizer, relative
to 2015
10% by 2030 5% by 2030
Selective breeding to reduce CH4 emissions
from enteric fermentation—Emission factor
reduction (CH4/tonne milk and/or beef) or
emissions reduction, relative to 2015
10% by 2030 0% by 2030
Increase natural forest afforestation and
reforestation—rates for three tiers (different
than high- and low-income): % increase in












Halt natural forest deforestation 0 ha/year
by 2030
0 ha/year by 2030
Energy supply No new installations of unabated coal
power plants
By 2025 By 2030
Increase of the share of renewables in total
electricity generation per year (starting in





Coal mine CH4 emissions recovery 30% by 2030 30% by 2030
Reduce venting and flaring of CH4 and CO2—
emission reduction, relative to 2015
36% by 2030 36% by 2030
Buildings Improve final energy efficiency of appliances
compared to 2015 (autonomous




7% by 2030 (starting
in 2025)
Improve final energy intensity of new
residential and commercial buildings
22 & 30 kWh/
(m2 yr) by 2025
22 & 30 kWh/(m2 yr)
by 2035
EU: 35 & 40 kWh/
(m2 yr) by 2025
No new installations of oil boiler capacity in
new and existing residential and commercial
buildings
By 2030 By 2040 EU: by 2020
Improve efficiency of existing buildings—
Share of existing buildings being renovated
11% by 2030 6% by 2030
Industry Apply CCS—Carbon captured and stored as
share of industry’s total CO2 emissions
(model-dependent)
1.5% by 2030 1.5% by 2040
Improve final energy efficiency, relative
to 2015
11% by 2030 6% by 2030
Reduce N2O emissions from adipic/acid
production—reduction, relative to 2015
99% by 2030 99% by 2030




0.78% per year by 2030
Improve average fuel efficiency of new
passenger cars
38 km/l by 2030 27 km/l by 2030
Increase the share of non-fossil in new
vehicle sales
50% by 2030 25% by 2030 China: 25%
by 2025
Waste Reduce CH4 emissions, relative to 2015 55% by 2030 28% by 2030
Economy-wide Carbon pricing—pathways for three tiers




Tier 2 (Russia, Eastern
Europe, China, Korea,
Latin America): 25 USD/
tCO2 by 2030
Tier 3 (all others):
10 USD/tCO2
by 2030
Reduce F-gas emissions, induced by policies,
relative to 2015
60% by 2030 38% by 2030
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median emissions gap found here and 5.5% of the 2030 emissions
reductions under the Bridge scenario). Compared to a 1.5 °C
scenario instead of 2Deg2020 (1.5 °C scenarios were not run here
but included from the CD-LINKS project4 for comparison), the
global emissions gap would be closed by 31% (21–57%) by 2030
and by 81% (71–85%) by 2050. The difference in 2030 emissions
between the NDCplus and 2Deg2020 is closed by 16% in the
USA, 49% in India, 56% in the EU and 68% in China.
Supplementary Fig. 1 shows the national rates of GHG
emissions reductions in the Bridge scenario, compared to the
CurPol, NDCplus, and cost-optimal cases (immediate: 2Deg2020
and delay: 2Deg2030). In contrast to the increase in GHG
emissions under current policies in some countries, emissions
decline everywhere in the Bridge scenario, especially in the
2030–2050 period. In most countries, the Bridge scenario shows
smaller reductions than the immediate action 2Deg2020 scenario
in the short term (2030), and smaller reductions than the
2Deg2030 scenario in the longer term (2050). As such, good
practice policies can constitute an alternate pathway in line with
limiting global warming to 2 °C, without relying on carbon
pricing alone as in cost-optimal scenarios, while not significantly
increasing the burden in the 2050s.
Which measures have the largest effect on emissions? The
emissions gap between the NDCplus and 2Deg2020 scenarios
amounts to approximately 12 GtCO2eq in 2030 (model median).
The Bridge scenario closes this gap with 60% (a 7.2 GtCO2eq
reduction). The energy supply sector (through higher renewable
energy share, electrification, energy efficiency improvement) is
the largest contributor to emissions reductions between the
NDCplus and Bridge scenarios, both in 2030 and in 2050 (Fig. 2
and Table 2). In most models, mitigation of non-CO2 emissions,
the transport sector (zero-carbon vehicles and efficiency
improvements), and AFOLU (notably in 2030) also play an
important role. This indicates potential to enhance ambition in
specific areas, which will need to be explored at the national level.
Changes in energy and land-use systems. Figure 3 shows pro-
jected changes in energy and land-use systems under five sce-
narios: CurPol, NDCplus, Bridge, 2Deg2020, and 2Deg2030. The
Bridge scenario significantly increases mitigation action com-
pared to the CurPol and NDCplus scenarios. In fact, on several
indicators, the prescribed policies (Table 1 and Supplementary
Tables) close the gap with the cost-optimal 2Deg2020 scenario
almost completely. By 2050, the Bridge scenario is more ambi-
tious than the 2Deg2020 scenario for many indicators, compen-
sating for the delay with respect to the cost-optimal pathway.
Figure 3 Panel a, for example, shows that the target to increase the
renewable electricity share by 1.4% per year in the Bridge scenario
leads to deployment far beyond the CurPol and NDCplus sce-
narios in 2050 (i.e., toward 70%, vs. around 50%), but similar to
2Deg2020 (in line with previous research20) and lower than
2Deg2030. In 2030, however, the Bridge scenario is similar to
2Deg2020, so it does not increase the global trend in terms of
installing renewables in the short term (it may do so regionally,
however, see Baptista et al11.). As a result of the assumed pene-
tration of non-fossil fuelled vehicles, the Bridge scenario shows a
significant increase in the share of electricity in transport, even
more so in Bridge than in 2Deg2020 (Panel b). This starts in
2030, but manifests especially in 2050. However, in some models,
the target to increase non-fossil fuelled vehicles actually leads to
an increase of biofuel powered engines (Supplementary Fig. 2)
rather than electrification (explaining the relatively large range),
but less so than the 2Deg2030 scenario in 2050. Following CCS,
efficiency improvement, and F-gas emission reduction targets in
industry, industrial emissions (expressed as CO2 emissions from
Fig. 1 Global GHG emissions (Gt CO2eq/year) between 2010 and 2050, as projected by the global models. Vertical bars: model range in 2050. Circles:
model median in 2050. Thick solid lines: median. Grey: 1.5 °C scenarios from the IPCC SR1.5 database are included for comparison (a selection was made
to cover the same models as represented here, with most similar scenario set-up, i.e., the 1.5 °C scenarios developed in the CD-LINKS project4). Projections
for the Bridge scenario without the carbon tax measure are shown in Supplementary Fig. 7, for NDCplus variant NDC_2050convergence in Supplementary
Fig. 8, and for 2050—2100 in Supplementary Fig. 9.
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industrial processes as well as F-gases, panel c), are projected to
decrease in Bridge slightly more so than in 2Deg2020 (by 2050).
Because the measures in the buildings sector focus on energy
efficiency improvements, the share of electricity in buildings
(panel d) is not projected to change significantly in the 2030s, but
Bridge makes up for that by 2050. Panel e shows that the affor-
estation policy leads to slightly more afforestation in 2030, fol-
lowed by a large scale-up in 2050, but not as large as in 2Deg2030.
As such, CO2 emissions from agriculture, forestry and other land-
use (AFOLU) are projected to be reduced by 38% (model median)
by 2030 and by 151% by 2050 in the Bridge scenario, relative to
2015 levels. Supplementary Fig. 3 shows the same indicators but
for the NDCplus-convergence scenario instead of NDCplus: by
2050, the convergence scenario is closer to the Bridge scenario
than NDCplus for most indicators. Supplementary Fig. 4, finally,
shows the projected changes in the primary energy mix. Bridge
sees lower total primary energy supply mainly due to the effi-
ciency improvement and transport electrification measures, but
not as low as 2Deg2020, and a shift from fossil fuels to renewable
energy sources, especially by 2050. As a result of the scale-up of
renewable energy, electrification of energy demand, and efficiency
improvements, CO2 emissions from the energy sector are pro-
jected to decrease. The Bridge scenario has notable co-benefits:
emissions of air pollutants such as black carbon, carbon mon-
oxide, nitrogen oxides, organic carbon, sulphur, and volatile
organic compounds are projected to decrease, compared to
NDCplus (Supplementary Fig. 12).
Costs of building the bridge. While the good practice policies
may have benefits in terms of social and political acceptability,
earlier work9 has highlighted that a set of regulatory measures
may be more costly than a comprehensive carbon pricing scheme,
leading to a noncost-optimal transition across regions and sec-
tors. A uniform price signal would ensure that mitigation hap-
pens first where costs are lowest, leading to the overall most
efficient outcome, in absence of other market failures. Although
unlikely to be achieved globally, this stylised assumption therefore
remains a useful benchmark. Furthermore, climate action as
represented in the Bridge scenario implies a more gradual path
for emission reductions in the period 2020–2030 compared to the
immediate implementation of the cost-optimal policy
(2Deg2020). This delay can further raise costs of the Bridge
scenario, depending on the evolution of technology costs. The
salience of a carbon price, however, may also raise opposition
especially from low-income households facing energy poverty and
Table 2 Share of sector in total GHG reduction from NDCplus to Bridge scenario (%), model range: minimum—maximum
(median). AFOLU: Agriculture, Forestry, and Other Land Use.
Year AFOLU Industry Buildings Transport Energy supply Industrial Processes Non-CO2
2030 −28.7–21.6 (7.8) −10.1–14.8 (6.6) −4.6–5.6 (2.3) 1.0–21.7 (8.9) 26.0–82.9 (50.1) −0.2–5.4 (0.5) 2.9–50.6 (36.3)
2050 −2.4–11.8 (7.3) 7.9–31.4 (13.9) 2.9–9.5 (6.5) 6.5–15.6 (13.1) 34.6–49.8 (41.9) 0.1–8.1 (4.0) 9.6–20.0 (16.4)
Fig. 2 Contribution of each sector to emission reductions between the NDCplus and Bridge scenario (negative values denote an increase in emissions
between NDCplus and Bridge, and are indicated with hashes). First bar: Emissions by sector in 2015. Second bar: emissions by sector in 2030 (panel a)
and 2050 (panel b), under NDCplus. Third—ninth bar: emission reduction in AFOLU (Agriculture, Forestry, and Other Land Use), industry, buildings,
transport, energy supply, industrial processes, non-CO2 emissions. Last bar: emissions by sector in 2030 (panel a) and 2050 (panel b), under Bridge. The
IMAGE model is shown here as an illustrative example; full model ranges are shown in Table 2, while individual model results are shown in the SI
(Supplementary Fig. 5). In addition, Supplementary Fig. 6 shows the sectoral contributions to emission reductions between the Bridge and
2Deg2020 scenarios in 2030.
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food-insecurity21, carbon-intensive regions and vulnerable trade-
exposed industries that may complicate or delay its
implementation22. Arguably, the good practice policies included
in the Bridge scenario face lower feasibility barriers and could
speed up climate action compared to a scenario in which only
cost-optimal policy measures are pursued. A fair evaluation of the
costs of the Bridge scenario therefore involves two comparisons:
one with the immediate and cost-optimal climate policy
(2Deg2020), and one with a delayed implementation of uniform
carbon pricing, starting in 2030 (2Deg2030) which requires more
disruptive action to meet the 2 °C target.
Our results (Fig. 4) indicate that although the Bridge scenario
raises policy costs (as expressed by GDP cost per tonne CO2eq
abated relative to the Current Policies scenario) in 2050 by more
than 20% (1–38%) compared to an immediate implementation of a
cost-optimal 2 °C scenario with globally uniform carbon prices
(2Deg2020), it has lower policy costs (Fig. 4a) and carbon prices
(Fig. 4b and Supplementary Fig. 10) in the near term (2030). The
Bridge scenario also outperforms a delayed 2 °C scenario (2Deg2030,
see Supplementary Methods) with costs being more than 10%
(-6–33%) lower in 2050. As such, our analysis suggests that early but
noncost-optimal action is preferred over climate policy delay.
Interestingly, not all models in the ensemble agree on the size
and sign of the trade-off between early and cost-optimal policy
implementation. Multiple and counteracting effects are at play.
Generally, good practice regulatory policies would raise costs
particularly when the resulting energy system deviates strongly from
the cost-optimal one. If the necessary changes are obvious, or when
there are low-hanging fruits for climate policy, then a similar
outcome may be achieved through regulation and carbon prices.
The phase-out of coal and the scale-up of renewable power
generation technologies23–25 may be an example that comes close
(Supplementary Fig. 11 shows that investments in the electricity
sector are projected to shift from fossil fuels to renewables).
However, for other trade-offs, such as efficiency improvements
versus fuel shift, or the allocation of emission reductions across
sectors, a mix of regulatory measures that leads to an outcome
resembling the cost-optimal one may be more difficult to achieve.
Therefore, while regulatory policies can be a pragmatic entry-point
for climate policy, cost-efficiency in the medium and long-term
(beyond 2050) is more easily achieved via comprehensive carbon
pricing schemes across all sectors and regions to avoid inter-sectoral
and inter-regional leakage12. The costs of delaying climate action,
on the other hand, depend on technological progress and the
availability and scalability of negative emission technologies (NETs)
in the future, among others26. For three out of four models that
capture economic growth endogenously, the costs of delay outweigh
the additional cost of regulatory good practice policies in 2050.
An advantage of the regulatory measures as implemented in
the Bridge scenario is that carbon prices remain at lower levels in
the near term, which may facilitate public acceptability and
implementation of carbon pricing schemes with a broad sector
coverage. If political consensus in favour of a comprehensive
pricing scheme is not found over time, then a further
intensification of the good practice policies may serve as a
practical way forward to close the emissions gap. At the same
time, the advantages of good practice policies in terms of
acceptability may be challenged if ambitious climate targets bring
cost elements to the forefront of the political debate.
Hence, our results suggest that a global roll-out of good
practice policies can be a useful approach to close the emissions
gap in the near term, while their role in climate policy in the
longer term should be reconsidered in the context of a broader
policy mix16, including carbon pricing27.
Discussion
Parties to the Paris Agreement were supposed to submit updated
NDCs and communicate their long-term strategies to the
Fig. 3 Projected changes in various indicators, for 2030 and 2050, for the CurPol, NDCplus, Bridge, 2Deg2020, and 2Deg2030 scenarios. Bars show
model median, error bars show the full range, and symbols show individual model results. Panel a share of renewables in electricity production (%), panel
b share of electricity in final energy demand of transportation (%), panel c Emissions of F-gases and industrial process CO2 emissions, relative to 2015
levels (%), panel d share of electricity in final energy demand of buildings (%), panel e total afforestation and reforestation (million ha).
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UNFCCC in 2020. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, these
timelines have been delayed and some countries have announced
that they will not submit an updated NDC, while some others
have not increased ambition in their updated NDC. However,
scaling up climate ambition and action remains necessary to keep
the Paris Agreement goals within reach. As the emissions gap
seems hard to close, we built a set of relevant scenarios that may
provide a pathway based on successful examples of policies. The
mitigation measures were defined in a two-way interaction with
country experts and assumptions were adjusted for different
regions if necessary. These scenarios, especially the good practice
policies (Bridge scenario), can support the ratcheting up of
mitigation ambition of NDCs.
Although the granularity of the Bridge scenario has improved
in terms of country differentiation compared to earlier studies,
some limitations remain. In most cases, we only distinguished
high-income and low-/middle-income countries, which (while an
advance on existing scenarios) is only a second-best option.
However, we did not find good arguments for country-specific
groupings in policy categories other than afforestation, where the
groupings are motivated by explicit afforestation targets in the
respective NDCs. Differentiating by income group is a pragmatic
approach that was approved by stakeholders from various
countries. While the measures were assessed to be implementable,
this might not always be the case when moving to the country-
level. Therefore, Baptista et al11. discuss the same set of scenarios
in the context of national feasibility considerations. Future work
could further analyse the sustainable development implications of
the Bridge scenario, for example, whether it has synergies with the
goal to eradicate poverty. The other way around, a bridge scenario
could be developed that takes the sustainable development goals
as a starting point to identify nationally relevant areas for
increased ambition in the 2030s.
Models implemented the set of measures in different ways. For
example, not all models were able to implement all measures
related to non-CO2, given their scope; while others show rela-
tively cheap abatement and high potential to implement measures
in the 2030s, resulting in a large range for the sector’s share in
emission reductions. The ranges, however, do tell a robust story
about the Bridge scenario in relation to the reference scenarios.
Although set at a relatively low level, the carbon price measure
was the single most effective policy in the 2030s. Removing it
from the set of measures resulted in significantly higher emissions
(Supplementary Fig. 7). However, as many countries or regions
already have a form of carbon pricing, it deserves a spot in the
selection of good practice policies, especially given the differ-
entiated timelines and pricing levels assumed in the Bridge sce-
nario. Finally, we have not considered the impact of the COVID-
19 pandemic quantitatively, effectively assuming a full recovery
without significant effect on long-term, global emissions25. The
policy measures explored here, however, can inform governments
that aim for green recovery packages28, by showing potential for
Fig. 4 Cost indicators for the Bridge scenario, compared to the other scenarios. Panel a GDP (in market exchange rates, MER) loss (relative to the CurPol
scenario) in Bridge, relative to 2Deg2020 (dark orange) and 2Deg2030 (yellow), for 2030 (left) and 2050 (right). Panel b Carbon price (US$2010/tCO2),
in 2030, 2040 and 2050. Bars: median, error bars: full range, symbols: individual models.
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ratcheting up mitigation ambition with a concrete set of
measures.
We have shown that good practice policies can help to reach the
2 °C target in the long-term. They ensure closing the global emis-
sions gap between NDCs and a cost-optimal 2 °C scenario by two-
thirds (model median) by 2030. After 2030, more ambitious mea-
sures are needed. Such a Bridge scenario leads to lower energy sector
emissions due to scale-up of renewable energy, electrification of
energy demand, and efficiency improvements, and to lower land-use
emissions due to afforestation—at levels and rates of change that are
somewhat less than the 2Deg2020 case and less than the 2Deg2030
case. The scenario is still in a position that allows meeting the 2 °C
goal, and, importantly, is less disruptive than 2Deg2030. However,
although we included a wide set of good practice policies, they are
jointly insufficient to put the world on track to meet the 1.5 °C
target. The Bridge scenario further illustrates that good practice
policies alone—without implementation of additional instruments
such as a comprehensive carbon pricing scheme—are not enough to
reach the 2 °C target. The Bridge scenario raises policy costs (as
expressed by GDP loss per tonne of CO2 abated relative to the
CurPol scenario) in 2050 by approximately 20% compared to a cost-
optimal 2 °C scenario (2Deg2020). When put in perspective of
economic growth in the coming three decades, this 20% cost
increase implies that annual economic growth rates in the Bridge
would be around 0.02 percentage points below the annual GDP
growth in 2Deg2020. The Bridge scenario outperforms the delayed
2 °C scenario (2Deg2030) with global economic impacts being more
than 10% lower in 2050. As such, early but noncost-optimal action is
preferred over climate policy delay. In the absence of immediate, all-
encompassing and ambitious climate policy measures, therefore, a
global roll-out and successful implementation of good practice
policies can put the world on track to a 2 °C-compatible pathway
without posing large additional challenges.
In short, acting stringently on 2 °C (2Deg2020) is needed, but,
collectively, we are not on track (NDCplus). If we do not
strengthen collective action until 2030, the best chance at limiting
global warming may be 2Deg2030. However, if we manage to
accelerate action until 2030 (Bridge), major disruption can be
avoided, even if we do not fully reach 2Deg2020. These results
illustrate that short-term (2030) implementation of practical
regulation-based policies is preferable over delayed climate action.
At the same time, the institutional set-up should aim to avoid
inefficient policy lock-in, as more efficient instruments may gain
political and societal support over time.
Methods
Models. Both national and global model teams followed the same scenario pro-
tocol for comparability. The global models included here are: AIM/CGE29,
COPPE-COFFEE30, IMAGE31, MESSAGEix-GLOBIOM32, POLES33,
PROMETHEUS34, REMIND-MAgPIE35, TIAM-Grantham36, WITCH-GLOBIOM
5.037. National-level results are presented in Baptista et al11.
Scenarios. In line with the global stocktake, the ratcheting up mechanism has been
applied in constructing the scenario protocol (see Supplementary Methods for the
full protocol text and Supplementary Tables for the detailed lists of good practice
policies). This means that the scenarios build upon one another in terms of
ambition and modelling assumptions. The Current policies scenario is the least
ambitious and the 2 °C scenario is the most ambitious.
Reference scenarios. The Current policies (CurPol) scenario incorporates middle of
the road socioeconomic conditions throughout the century, based on the second
marker baseline scenario from the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSP2)38. It
also assumes that climate, energy and land-use policies that are currently ratified
are implemented (cut-off date 1 July 2019).
The NDC-plus scenario builds further upon the CurPol scenario and assumes
that the conditional NDCs (both unconditional and conditional NDC actions) as
submitted by April 2020 are implemented by 2030. After 2030, the scenario reflects
continuation of effort (see below).
Bridge scenario. The Bridge scenario builds upon the CurPol scenario and assumes
that certain good practice policies, which have shown to be effective in some
countries7–9, will be implemented globally from 2020 until 2030 (Supplementary
Table 1 in Supplementary Data lists the good practice policies, while Supple-
mentary Table 2 gives an overview of their implementation in models, with the
implemented shares ranging from 44% to 94%). After 2030, the Bridge scenario
transitions to a 2 °C scenario following a cost-effective pathway (see below). The set
of policies was defined in dialogue with national model teams, granting a more
realistic scenario narrative (for more details, see the Supplementary Information).
This was done in multiple rounds. First, national modelling teams responded to the
proposed good practice policies (based on literature), considering whether these
policies could be realistically implemented in their countries and, if not, what other
target levels or years would be feasible. These teams cover Australia, Brazil, Canada,
China, EU, India, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Russia, United States; i.e.,
approximately 75% of global emissions. Second, the policy list was adjusted to
differentiate country groups, regarding the timing and stringency of the targets.
Third, some national models ran the refined scenarios and provided feedback,
upon which the list was further refined. As such, we eventually defined two country
groups (high-income and middle-/low-income), and in some cases three (adding
Other, with different definition per measure), which were found to offer enough
differentiation to be nationally relevant while still adhering to a common set of
policy measures. Finally, all national and global model teams ran the agreed set of
scenarios.
Country differentiation of good practice policies
A distinction is made between low/medium-income and high-income countries in terms
of timing and stringency of good practice policy targets. The AFOLU sector’s measures
are differentiated mostly in terms of stringency, not timing, considering the current
differences in efficiency between high- and lower-income countries. Afforestation rates
have a more specific country differentiation, based on NDC ambition. Energy supply
measures are rather similar between countries as these are already more widespread, with
the exception of coal phase-out, where low-income countries would need more time.
Measures in the buildings sector are differentiated in terms of timing (overall energy
intensity of buildings and oil boilers) as well as stringency (efficiency of appliances and
renovation rate) given the different starting points and future service demand in country
groups. For industry, the CCS measure was differentiated in timing only, as the devel-
opment of the technology has a global nature, but its implementation may encounter
different institutional barriers between higher and lower-income countries. For adipic/
acid production, no differentiation was applied as significant emissions reductions are
already technically possible. For F-gases, the differentiation is in line with the Kigali
Agreement. Transport measures were not differentiated for aviation due to its global
nature, but vehicle measures were assumed to be less stringent in low-income countries
given different starting points. Given the more abundant use of landfilling in lower-
income countries, reductions in methane emissions from waste were assumed to be
smaller than in high-income countries.
Carbon pricing
Finally, as opposed to Fekete et al7., carbon pricing is included as good practice policy,
although it may be considered as a top-down policy of different nature than the other
policies. Carbon pricing and emission trading schemes have been successfully implemented
in various countries. Furthermore, previous work9 highlights that good practice regulatory
policies should be considered as complements to pricing-based approaches. In the simula-
tions, the carbon price applies to all gases and sectors, hence represents an idealized view of
carbon pricing schemes. It does not take the highest carbon price currently observed as
starting point, but rather an approach in which countries were divided in three tiers with
different carbon price levels and timelines to be most relevant to the countries represented
here, and to better reflect the current status of pricing measures, such as ETS39. As a variant
and to analyse the effect of this measure, some models ran an additional scenario excluding
the carbon price measure (see Supplementary Fig. 7).
Post-2030 assumptions. The Bridge scenario follows the good practice policies until
2030, after which the scenario transitions smoothly to the 2 °C scenario by
remaining within the carbon budget consistent with the 2 °C target (1000 GtCO2
for 2011–2100). This was implemented via a carbon price, with the scenario
converging from the regionally differentiated 2030 carbon prices as prescribed to a
global carbon price in 2050 that is in line with the 2 °C carbon budget. It is assumed
that the gradual implementation of climate policy in the 2020–2030 period can
build up enough momentum (and technology development) to move to a more
comprehensive climate policy after 2030. The 2 °C (2Deg2020 and 2Deg2030)
scenarios assume that an average temperature increase of 2 °C without over-
shooting is reached by 2100 in a cost-effective way (starting from 2020 in
2Deg2020 and from 2030 in 2Deg2030). National modelling teams used a carbon
budget derived from the global carbon budget of 1000 Gt CO2 in the period
2011–2100 (including 2011 emissions), as done in CD-LINKS (https://www.cd-
links.org/)4. This global carbon budget represents a 66% probability of keeping
global warming below 2 °C. Carbon budgets have been revised since the CD-LINKS
project in such a way that 1000 Gt is even more stringent than previously.
Cumulative CO2 emissions in the 2 °C scenarios (2Deg2020, 2Deg2030, and
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Bridge) are not all exactly 1000 Gt, but range from 788 Gt CO2 to 1540 Gt CO2
(2011–2100), which is still within the range considered to be in line with 2 °C.
For the CurPol and NDC-plus scenarios, a continuation of efforts after the
target year was assumed. This was implemented by extrapolating the equivalent
carbon price in 2030, using the GDP growth rate of the different regions up to
2050. The equivalent carbon price represents the value of carbon that would yield
the same emissions reduction as the NDC policies in a region. If a region has a
carbon price of zero while implementing the NDC in 2030, a minimum carbon
price of 1 $/tCO2 in 2030 was assumed. If a region has a negative carbon price in
2030, the trajectory resulting from 1 $/tCO2 was offset to the model’s 2030 starting
point. For land use, a carbon price ceiling of $200/tCO2 was applied.
Data availability
Model results can be found in the COMMIT scenario explorer: https://
data.ece.iiasa.ac.at/commit/#/login?redirect=%2Fworkspaces. Policy relevant data is
available in the Global Stocktake tool: https://themasites.pbl.nl/o/global-stocktake-
indicators/#home. The scenario data generated in this study have been deposited in the
Zenodo40 database under accession code https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.5163588. Source
data are provided with this paper.
Code availability
The models are documented on the common integrated assessment model
documentation (https://www.iamcdocumentation.eu/index.php/IAMC_wiki), and
several have published open source code (e.g. REMIND: https://github.com/
remindmodel/remind), visualisation tools or detailed documentation (see references).
The R-script that was used to generate the figures can be found on GitHub: https://
github.com/Hel1vs/Bridge and Zenodo41: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.5139955.
Received: 18 December 2020; Accepted: 6 October 2021;
References
1. UNFCCC. Paris Agreement: Decision 1/CP.17 - UNFCCC document FCCC/CP/
2015/L.9/Rev.1, http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf
UNFCCC (2015).
2. Rogelj, J. et al. Paris Agreement climate proposals need a boost to keep
warming well below 2 °C. Nature 534, 631–639 (2016).
3. Vrontisi, Z. et al. Enhancing global climate policy ambition towards a 1.5 °C
stabilization: a short-term multi-model assessment. Environ. Res. Lett. 13,
044039 (2018).
4. Roelfsema, M. et al. Taking stock of national climate policies to evaluate
implementation of the Paris Agreement. Nat. Commun. 11, 2096 (2020).
5. Fujimori, S. et al. Implication of Paris Agreement in the context of long-term
climate mitigation goals. SpringerPlus 5, 1620 (2016).
6. Staub-Kaminski, I., Zimmer, A., Jakob, M. & Marschinski, R. Climate policy in
practice: a typology of obstacles and implications for integrated assessment
modeling. Clim. Change Econ. 05, 1440004 (2014).
7. Fekete, H. et al. A review of successful climate change mitigation policies in
major emitting economies and the potential of global replication. Renew.
Sustain. Energy Rev. 137, 110602 (2021).
8. Roelfsema, M. et al. Reducing global GHG emissions by replicating successful
sector examples: the ‘good practice policies’ scenario. Clim. Policy 18,
1103–1113 (2018).
9. Kriegler, E. et al. Short term policies to keep the door open for Paris climate
goals. Environ. Res. Lett. 13, 74022 (2018).
10. Fekete, H. et al. Impacts of good practice policies on regional and global greenhouse
gas emissions. (NewClimate Institute, PBL Netherlands Environmental
Assessment Agency and International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis,
Cologne, Germany; The Hague, the Netherlands; Laxenburg, Austria, 2015).
11. Baptista, L. B. et al. Good practice policies to bridge the emissions gap in key
countries (Submitted, 2021).
12. Bertram, C. et al. Complementing carbon prices with technology policies to
keep climate targets within reach. Nat. Clim. Change 5, 235–239 (2015).
13. Höhne, N. et al. Bridging the Gap: Enhancing Mitigation Ambition and Action
at G20 Level and Globally. An Advance Chapter of The Emissions Gap Report
2019. (United Nations Environment Programme, Nairobi, 2019).
14. Trutnevyte, E. Does cost optimization approximate the real-world energy
transition? Energy 106, 182–193 (2016).
15. Zhang, D. et al. Integrity of firms’ emissions reporting in China’s early carbon
markets. Nat. Clim. Change 9, 164–169 (2019).
16. Pahle, M. et al. Sequencing to ratchet up climate policy stringency. Nat. Clim.
Change 8, 861–867 (2018).
17. Meckling, J., Sterner, T. & Wagner, G. Policy sequencing toward
decarbonization. Nat. Energy 2, 918–922 (2017).
18. Klenert, D. et al. Making carbon pricing work for citizens. Nat. Clim. Change
8, 669–677 (2018).
19. UNFCCC Secretariat. Nationally determined contributions under the Paris
Agreement - Synthesis report by the secretariat. (UNFCCC, Bonn, 2021).
20. Luderer, G. et al. Residual fossil CO2 emissions in 1.5–2 °C pathways. Nat.
Clim. Change 8, 626–633 (2018).
21. Fujimori, S. et al. A multi-model assessment of food security implications of
climate change mitigation. Nat. Sustainability 2, 386–396 (2019).
22. Jenkins, J. D. Political economy constraints on carbon pricing policies: What
are the implications for economic efficiency, environmental efficacy, and
climate policy design? Energy Policy 69, 467–477 (2014).
23. IRENA. Renewable power generation costs in 2019. (International Renewable
Energy Agency, Abu Dhabi, 2020).
24. IEA. Renewables 2020. (IEA, Paris, 2020).
25. IEA. World Energy Outlook 2020. (IEA, Paris, 2020).
26. Daioglou, V. et al. Bioenergy technologies in long-run climate change
mitigation: results from the EMF-33 study. Clim. Change, https://doi.org/
10.1007/s10584-020-02799-y (2020).
27. Oshiro, K. & Fujimori, S. Stranded investment associated with rapid energy
system changes under the mid-century strategy in Japan. Sustain. Sci. https://
doi.org/10.1007/s11625-020-00862-2 (2020).
28. Andrijevic, M., Schleussner, C.-F., Gidden, M. J., McCollum, D. L. & Rogelj, J.
COVID-19 recovery funds dwarf clean energy investment needs. Science 370,
298–300 (2020).
29. Fujimori, S. et al. AIM/CGE [basic] Manual. 1–87 (2012).
30. COPPE/UFRJ. Model Documentation - COFFEE-TEA, https://www.iamc
documentation.eu/index.php/Model_Documentation_-_COFFEE-TEA IAMC
(2020).
31. Stehfest, E., Van Vuuren, D. P., Bouwman, L. & Kram, T. Integrated
Assessment of Global Environmental Change with Model Description and
Policy Applications IMAGE 3.0. (PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment
Agency, 2014).
32. Huppmann, D. et al. The MESSAGEix Integrated Assessment Model and the
ix modeling platform (ixmp): An open framework for integrated and cross-
cutting analysis of energy, climate, the environment, and sustainable
development. Environ. Model. Softw. 112, 143–156 (2019).
33. Després, J., Keramidas, K., Schmitz, A., Kitous, A. & Schade, B. POLES-JRC
model documentation – 2018 update, EUR 29454 EN. (Publications Office of
the European Union, Luxembourg, 2018).
34. Fragkos, P. & Kouvaritakis, N. Model-based analysis of Intended Nationally
Determined Contributions and 2°C pathways for major economies. Energy
160, 965–978 (2018).
35. Aboumahboub, T. et al. REMIND - REgional Model of INvestments and
Development - Version 2.1.0, https://www.pik-potsdam.de/research/transfor
mation-pathways/models/remind PIK (2020).
36. Loulou, R. & Labriet, M. ETSAP-TIAM: the TIMES integrated assessment
model part I: model structure. Computational Manag. Sci. 5, 7–40 (2008).
37. RFF-CMCC EIEE. WITCH documentation, https://doc.witchmodel.org/ (2019).
38. Riahi, K. et al. The Shared Socioeconomic Pathways and their energy, land
use, and greenhouse gas emissions implications: An overview. Glob. Environ.
Change 42, 153–168 (2017).
39. ICAP. Emissions Trading Worldwide - Status Report 2021. (International
Carbon Action Partnership, Berlin, 2021).
40. COMMIT consortium. COMMIT Scenario Explorer. COMMIT consortium
(Zenodo). https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.5163588 (2021).
41. van Soest, H. Global roll-out of comprehensive policy measures may aid in
bridging emissions gap First release of the COMMIT Bridge repository. v.
1.0.0 (Zenodo, 2021 https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.5139955).
Acknowledgements
This study benefited from the financial support of the European Union via the COMMIT
project (Climate pOlicy assessment and Mitigation Modeling to Integrate national and
global Transition Pathways), financed by Directorate General Climate Action (DG
CLIMA) and EuropeAid under grant agreement No. 21020701/2017/770447/SER/CLI-
MA.C.1 EuropeAid/138417/DH/SER/MulitOC (COMMIT).
Author contributions
C.B., E.K., A.M., and others in the REMIND(MAgPIE) team developed the scenarios for
the REMIND-MAgPIE model; R.S., L.B.B., and others in the COFFEE team developed
the scenarios for the COFFEE model; P.F. developed the scenarios for the PRO-
METHEUS model; K.R., B.v.R., G.U., O.F. developed the scenarios for the MESSAGEix-
GLOBIOM team; D.S.H., K.O., S.F. developed the scenarios for the AIM team; M.H.,
M.R., D.v.V., M.d.E., H.v.S. developed the scenarios for the IMAGE model; L.D., L.A.R.,
M.T. developed the scenarios for the WITCH model; J.D., K.K. developed the scenarios
for the POLES model; N.G., S.M., A.K. developed the scenarios for the TIAM-Grantham
model; G.I. developed the scenarios for the GCAM-USA model (presented elsewhere)
and served as national expert. H.v.S. coordinated the analysis, wrote the paper, and
NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-021-26595-z ARTICLE
NATURE COMMUNICATIONS |         (2021) 12:6419 | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-021-26595-z | www.nature.com/naturecommunications 9
created the figures; T.V. did the analysis for the costs section; all authors contributed to
the definition of the good practice policy package, the analysis, and article review.
Competing interests
There are no competing interests to declare.
Additional information
Supplementary information The online version contains supplementary material
available at https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-021-26595-z.
Correspondence and requests for materials should be addressed to Heleen L.van Soest.
Peer review information Nature Communications thanks Anne Olhoff, George
Wamukoya and the other, anonymous, reviewer(s) for their contribution to the peer
review of this work.
Reprints and permission information is available at http://www.nature.com/reprints
Publisher’s note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in
published maps and institutional affiliations.
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give
appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative
Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party
material in this article are included in the article’s Creative Commons license, unless
indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the
article’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory
regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/.
© The Author(s) 2021
ARTICLE NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-021-26595-z
10 NATURE COMMUNICATIONS |         (2021) 12:6419 | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-021-26595-z | www.nature.com/naturecommunications
